The following is a summary derived from over 100 pages of notes that pertain a conspiracy by a group of global elites to effect a remote form of jurisdiction over the Malaysian economy by sabotaging 1MDB and destroying Najib Razak.
i. Khadem Al-Qubaisi (Qubaisi) – Former MD of IPIC and chairman of Aabar Properties
ii. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan (Mansour) – IPIC chairman
iii. Tony Blair (Blair) – former British premier, Mubadala advisor, JPMorgan Chase & Co (JP) advisor, PetroSaudi advisor
iv. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (Mohammed) – Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mansour’s elder brother, chair of Mubadala Development Company PJSC
v. Najib Razak (Najib) – Former Prime Minister of Malaysia
vi. Ahmad Husni Mohamad Hanadzla (Husni) – former second Minister of Finance, Malaysia
vii. Shahrol Azral Ibrahim Halmi (Shahrol) – former CEO of 1MDB
viii. George Soros (Soros) – Billionaire anarchist, leader of “Third Party Group” comprising billionaire Italian and Swiss funders, founder of Quantum Fund, Soros Fund, etc.
ix. Clare Rewcastle Brown (Clare) – founder and Chief Editor of Sarawak Report, paid by Mahathir and team Blair
x. Dr Mahathir Mohamad (Mahathir) – Prime Minister of Malaysia
xi. Muhyiddin Yassin (Muhyiddin) – Home Minister
xii. Amanda Staveley (Ms Staveley) –British con woman
xiii. Khairuddin Abu Hassan (Khairuddin) – former UMNO Batu Kawan division deputy head
xiv. Matthias Chang (Matthias) – Mahathir confidante and lawyer
xv. Michael Oh-Lau Chong Jin (Michael) – regional head of debt capital markets at Maybank Kim Eng Group (MKEG)
xvi. John Chong (John) – CEO of MKEG
xvii. Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus (Nor Shamsiah) – Governor of Bank Negara
xviii. Zeti Akhtar Aziz (Zeti) – former Governor of Bank Negara
Prepared by: Raggie Jessy
Developments at the Abu Dhabi front
1. Amanda Staveley is a British businesswoman noted for her connections with Mideast businessmen and members of royalty.
2. In October 2008, Staveley registered PCP Gulf Invest 1, 2 and 3 (PGI 1 to 3) in Jersey and the BVI.
3. The establishment of these companies, however, was strangely coincidental with Mansour’s £3.5 billion pledge to Barclays which Ms. Staveley herself helped finalize.
4. On the 24thof March 2009, Ms. Staveley secured a further 758,437,618 shares from Barclays.
5. These shares were made issuable to PGI3 upon the exercise of certain warrants by the company. Several top executives from Barclays were puzzled that the bank had issued those warrants to PGI3 despite the company being in Ms. Staveley’s name and that of her partner, Craig Eadie.
6. To quash the perception of irregularity, Marcus convinced Barclays’ executives that an official from IPIC was ‘holding’ PGI3 in trust for Ms. Staveley.
7. That was the truth, since the US Securities and Exchange Commission allowed Qubaisi to file Schedule 13G on the 1stof September 2009 pursuant to an Option Deed dated the 1st of June 2009.
8. Under the terms of the deed, KAQ Holdings Limited, a BVI concern wholly owned by Qubaisi, had the option to acquirefrom IPIC the entire issued share capital of PGI3, an option Qubaisi first exercised on the 7th of June 2009 and thereafter on the 1st of September 2009 and the 16th of February 2010.
9. On the 2ndof June 2009, IPIC announced the sale of £3.5 billion worth of Barclays shares and £1.5 billion worth of convertible loan notes.
10. The media was all over the story, claiming that the Abu Dhabi owned investment company generated profits worth £1.45 billion.
11. However, my team discovered that the profits were worth almost £3 billion (USD4.83 billion) that included an estimated £1 billion (USD1.61 billion) Mansour and Qubaisi siphoned through a network of BVI companies.
12. Qubaisi forged company documents just to conceal from investors transactions worth a little over £2 billion that rightfully belonged to the government of Abu Dhabi.
13. Qubaisi had planned to use that wealth to lure Southeast Asian economies into some investment schemes through the BVI.
14. He set his sights on China and discussed with Mansour ways in which IPIC could get involved in China’s offshore interests.
15. Mansour approached his brother, Mohammed, who then approached Blair and discussed ways in which the Abu Dhabi government could lure the Chinese into partnerships.
16. Having previously bailed Carlyle out, Mohammed expected something in return. He expected Blair to work out a partnership between China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co. Ltd. (CGNPC) and Mubadala through the China Development Bank, or CDB.
17. Blair assured Mohammed that he could pull it off and even threw in the possibility of Mubadala establishing a joint fund with CDB.
18. A very pleased and excited Mohammed immediately appointed Blair as Mubadala’s principal advisor to oversee the sovereign wealth fund’s energy investments.
19. The appointment came with a price tag of £1 million per annum which Blair got Mubadala to declare as his annual salary. Documents my team sighted revealed that Blair has thus far earned £30 million simply by sealing a bunch of meaningless agreements with the Chinese on behalf of Mubadala.
20. Qubaisi was not at all pleased with what had gone on. He complained to Mansour that the plan was for Mohammed and Blair to assist IPIC establish some form of a working relationship with the Chinese.
21. I am told that Mansour responded by telling Qubaisi, “my brother knows what he is doing.”
Development at the Malaysian front
22. On the 22ndof July 2009, the (then) Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri Najib Tun Razak, announced a decision by his government to assume ownership of an existing Malaysian fund, the Terengganu Investment Authority (TIA). The fund was renamed 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) and established primarily to forge global partnerships and to promote foreign direct investment.
23. By then, Qubaisi had whipped up quite a bad reputation for the manner in which he conducted business with Barclays and was on the radars of British financial regulators. Qubaisi realised that he didn’t have much of a future with investors in the UK. He told Mansour that IPIC needed to gradually shift its focus to 1MDB, Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund.
24. Qubaisi reasoned that 1MDB was in its infancy and lacked experience in ways to deal with the Arabs. For some reason, he seemed sure that the then Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer (CEO) of the fund, Dato’ Shahrol Azral Ibrahim Halmi, was “someone who could be bent.”
25. On the 11thof January 2010, 1MDB made public a multibillion dollar joint-venture initiative with the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). The announcement triggered a shockwave that led to a meeting between Blair and Soros to discuss “the Malaysian threat.”
26. It was during this meeting, held in Manchester later that month, that Soros plotted to turn the Chinese against 1MDB and the Najib administration.
27. Soros made it clear that he did not want a Southeast Asian oil producing country to expand on its energy ambitions with China.
28. With the Republic fast becoming the world’s largest importer of crude oil and teeming with ambition to plunder the South China Sea, he knew that the government of China would be receptive to Southeast Asian partnerships just to ward off a western influence within the region.
29. Soros knew that Malaysia, being a Muslim majority populous, stood at the epicentre of disputes over security in the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea, waterways pivotal to the Chinese oil trade.
30. He knew the Chinese needed 1MDB to be dependent on China’s trade proliferation. The more the fund was dependent on the Chinese, the more likely Najib would agree to military cooperation with China to secure the trade gateways.
Plan to sabotage 1MDB
31. Husni came to know early in 2013 what Shahrol had known since December 2012. The former minister discovered that the BVI registered Aabar was in fact a vehicle through which Qubaisi robbed the Malaysian fund.
32. It was brought to his attention that a mismatch existed in 1MDB’s dealings with IPIC. Yet, Husni deviously chose to remain silent and instead played innocent by questioning the government’s motives for setting up the wealth fund.
33. A month after 1MDB sealed a multi-billion-dollar joint-venture agreement with China’s SGCC (refer preceding article), Qubaisi began establishing a network of entities in the BVI that grew in numbers with each passing month.
34. By 2014, there were at least five entities bearing the name Aabar, two of which were struck off on the 1stof May that year pursuant to Section 2013(1)(c) of the BVI Business Companies Act (2004). The companies had defaulted in payment of annual fees and fines imposed for various offences.
35. Documents I was allowed to sight revealed that these entities – Aabar Resources (Global) Limited (Aabar Global) and Aabar Strategic Investments Limited (Aabar Strategic) – along with several others had facilitated transfers worth billions for IPIC despite them being unrelated to the Abu Dhabi fund.
36. I was told that the money ended up being spirited through the US financial system before being converted into fixed assets.
37. I was further told that a sizable portion of money that was channelled through Qubaisi’s BVI network in 2013 had originated from 1MDB.
38. It was brought to my attention that Husni is at this very moment the beneficial owner of a property unit in the US worth approximately USD5 million, purchased using wealth Qubaisi generated by moving that money around the BVI and, thereafter, the US.
39. It seems that Husni was paid to keep his mouth shut.
40. The man who taught Qubaisi everything there was to know about tax havens and money laundering was Jürgen Mossack.
41. The first thing Mossack told Qubaisi to do was to coax Amanda Staveley into transferring the ownership of PGI3 to Nexus Capital Investing Limited, a BVI concern wholly owned by the Abu Dhabi International United Investments LLC, or ADIUI.
42. ADIUI, in turn, was 100 percent owned by Mansour, meaning, the IPIC chair had gained full control of those shares. Mossack needed the ownership transferred to Mansour as relations between Ms. Staveley and IPIC had gone to pot. As Qubaisi understood it, Mansour was to dispose of those shares and channel proceeds through his BVI network.
43. However, just as Mansour was about to do that, word got out that Mohammed, Mansour’s brother, was in discussions with certain Abu Dhabi officials on the possibility of establishing partnerships with 1MDB.
44. It is not known if the Malaysian government was in touch with Mohammed at this point. Nonetheless, Mansour made many attempts to dissuade his brother, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, from diving into a deal with the Malaysian government. But Mohammed stood his ground.
45. As a result, Mansour decided to hold on to his seven-odd percent in Barclays just yet. The thing that Mansour feared most was that his brother would get him to dump proceeds from the sale of those shares into 1MDB, the same way the Crown Prince got him to pledge billions to Barclays in 2008. Mansour went on to caution Blair that his brother was dead serious about forging an alliance with the Malaysian fund.
46. On the 18thof October 2010, Blair’s biggest fear came to life when Mubadala signed two collaborative agreements centered on energy and infrastructural development worth up to USD7 billion with 1MDB through two of its subsidiaries, Mubadala Real Estate & Hospitality (MREH) and Mubadala Industry (MI).
47. I am told, the announcement triggered some back and forth communication between Qubaisi, Mossack and a group of Emirati businessmen linked to Blair and Marcus. The group discussed ways to ‘fracture’ Mohammed’s ties with Malaysia and decided that the best way forward was to reduce 1MDB to insolvency.
48. An interesting point to note is that the group spoke of ways to generate wealth using funds from 1MDB. The Emirati faction conceded to wait for a time that was most opportune to strike.
49. That opportunity came on the 7thof March 2012 when 1MDB announced plans to acquire Tanjong Energy Holdings Sdn Bhd for USD2.81 billion from the person who controlled it, Tan Sri Ananda Krishnan.
50. 1MDB’s purchase of Tanjong afforded the Malaysian fund a total net generating capacity of 3,951MW through control of the unit’s eight power plants. Months later, on the 14thof August 2012, 1MDB made public a decision to extend that capacity through the purchase of the Genting Group’s 97.7 percent stake in a power and utility unit, Mastika Lagenda Sdn Bhd.
51. The USD738.01 purchase gave the Malaysian fund control of Mastika’s 75 percent in power generator Genting Sanyen Power and all of Mastika’s holdings in Mastika Utilities & Services and Mastika Water Management. To raise capital needed for the purchases, 1MDB issued two bonds worth USD1.75 billion each through two of its subsidiaries, 1MDB Energy Limited and 1MDB Energy (Langat) Limited.
52. Qubaisi wasted very little time in getting IPIC to guarantee all obligations (principal and associated interests) related to those bonds. But the guarantee came with a very steep price. Under the terms of an agreement sealed between the two funds, 1MDB was to park a security deposit worth USD1.4 billion with IPIC, which Shahrol later authorized to Aabar-BVI.
53. I am told, Shahrol came to know in December 2012 that Qubaisi planned to squeeze 1MDB for cash. He understood why IPIC had made such exorbitant demands, including stock options that gave IPIC and all its subsidiaries the right to acquire up to a 49 percent stake in 1MDB Energy Sdn Bhd, a subsidiary company of the Malaysian fund (since renamed Powertek Investment Holding Sdn Bhd, or PIHSB.
54. But Shahrol made no mention of this to Najib or the bulk of the fund’s board members. While my team is still in the midst of a discovery into Shahrol’s dealings with the Mideast, it appears that the former CEO of 1MDB may have struck a deal of sorts with Qubaisi some time in December 2012 itself.
55. Qubaisi’s interest in PIHSB stemmed from the firm’s 100 percent holding in Krishnan’s Tanjong unit (since renamed Powertek energy Sdn Bhd, or PESB). Months later, Qubaisi came to know of a USD 1.9 billion syndicated bridging loan that 1MDB secured through a consortium of borrowers led by the Malayan Banking Berhad (Maybank).
56. All this would have been fine if we assume that officials from 1MDB had informed Qubaisi of the bridging loan. However, Qubaisi had in his possession confidential information pertaining transactions 1MDB had performed since 2009, including summary notes of negotiations that took place between the Malaysian fund and Maybank officials in 2012.
57. Prior to negotiations that took place between 1MDB and IPIC, Blair had already been tipped off by officials from PetroSaudi of dealings that had gone on between the Malaysian fund and the Saudis. The information related to a USD2.5 billion partnership PetroSaudi had entered with 1MDB on the 30thof September 2009. Basically, Blair needed to know if there were people in 1MDB that his team could use.
58. Blair was given access to such information due to a £41,000 a month advisory role he secretly negotiated with PetroSaudi back in November 2010. Apart from the two percent commission that came with every deal he helped broker with the Chinese, Blair was promised access to confidential information that pertained the Saudi firm and its dealings with foreign wealth funds.
59. But that is not all. Blair found himself in a unique position owing to another advisory position he held. On the 1stof January 2008, Blair was made the advisor of JPMorgan Chase & Co (JP), the largest financial institution in the US by net asset worth. Blair negotiated the role through Jamie Dimon, the bank’s chairman and CEO, who offered the former British premier an annual salary of £2 million without the need for him to enter office.
60. Through an executive linked to Michael Cavanagh, Dimon’s deputy, Blair was fed top secret information that pertained 1MDB and its dealings with PetroSaudi. As if that wasn’t peculiar enough, the same executive seemed to be in possession of details pertaining the USD1.9 billion syndicated bridging loan that 1MDB secured in 2012 to part finance the purchase of Krishnan’s power holdings. Those details were handed over to Blair in April 2013.
61. Upon investigation, a team from the US I used to deal with claimed that they had traced the leak of information to an individual subordinate to the current CEO of the Maybank Kim Eng Group (MKEG), Dato’ John Chong. Back in March 2013 when the leak took place, the 13thMalaysian general election was slated to be around the corner. Chong was yet the CEO of Maybank Investment Bank Berhad and was a year away from becoming MKEG’s acting head.
62. I am told, the Maybank official fed Cavanagh’s associate everything that needed to be known about the syndicated loan and a lot more. Blair went on to channel that information to Qubaisi, who in turn, passed it over to a group of Emirati businessmen. With the wealth of information, Qubaisi was able to plan his moves very carefully, knowing well in advance that 1MDB was positioned precariously and would crumble if it defaulted any of its loans.
63. The Maybank official was receiving instructions from someone in the Ministry of Finance. It seems that a group of Malaysian bankers were already involved in a conspiracy to sabotage 1MDB even before Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad got involved.
64. And yes, there was talk of a ‘reward’ in the event 1MDB was reduced to insolvency.
65. In July 2013 or some time thereabouts, the Maybank official commenced a series of communications with another official from Bank Negara.
66. I am told, these officials, who went by various pseudonyms, received instructions from someone who appeared to be a top executive in CIMB who was specific with instructions to prevent 1MDB from “reducing its debt to equity ratio”.
67. A month later, a series of multi-channelled communications commenced between officials from Bank Negara, Maybank, CIMB, AmBank, Bank Muamalat, the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Securities Commission, all of whom went by very peculiar pseudonyms and spoke in very peculiar terms.
68. The back and forth related to plans by Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin todeprive 1MDB of oxygen and to depict the fund’s Board of Directors as being fraudsters who helped Najib siphon money belonging to Malaysians.
69. Prior to the back and forth between these officials, Muhyiddin became the first Malaysian politician to be approached by a representative from Blair’s camp, who met the then deputy premier’s aide in June 2013 and told him that an international conspiracy to sabotage 1MDB had begun.
70. The representative gave Muhyiddin’s aide a peek into “evidence of 1MDB’s precarious position” that Blair’s camp had obtained from PetroSaudi, JP and Maybank.
71. Muhyiddin immediately approached Mahathir and conveyed to him that 1MDB was about to be sabotaged.
72. Muhyiddin was offered a cut amounting some USD30 million in the event the former deputy premier could convince the Malaysian authorities that Najib was responsible for dissipating billions from 1MDBinto thin air. The broad idea was for Muhyiddin to keep the spotlight pointed away from Qubaisi and his team while they worked to bankrupt the Malaysian fund.
73. To leverage his position, Muhyiddin roped Tony Pua into the conspiracy by telling the DAP parliamentarian that 1MDB was about to be sabotaged by a group of foreigners.
Plan 1MDB destruct
74. 1MDB first decided to list its power assets in 2012, days after the fund purchased Genting’s Mastika units. On the 17thof August 2012, someone with knowledge of the matter confirmed that the fund had planned to raise as much as USD2 billion in an Initial Public Offering (IPO) to help lessen its debt load.
75. The plan was for the IPO to be made before the 13thgeneral election. Instead, 1MDB issued bonds worth USD3 billion which Goldman Sachs then underwrote and sold at prices above the preset minimum.
76. Word of the bond deal was communicated to Blair by a man named Jackson Eisenpresser, who fed the former British premier the A-Z pertaining the deal. Late in 2013, Eisenpresser told Blair that the IPO had been deferred to a date yet to be fixed by Najib and his men.
77. Members of Blair’s team contrived a plan to sabotage the IPO. Per plans, Mansour was to have come out on the 15thof August 2014 to announce that 1MDB had yet to fulfill part of its obligations to IPIC pursuant to agreements that existed between the two funds.
78. That month, certain senior officials from 1MDB were approached by representatives of Mahathir and Daim who wanted them to act as moles within 1MDB with the stated intent of sabotaging the IPO.
79. Maybank’s Michael and John (see character designations) were told to jam the loans so that the IPO would not go on. The person who issued these instructions was a senior executive directly under Bank Negara’s then Deputy Governor, Datuk Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus. I am told, the executive acted at Nor Shamsiah’s behest.
80. I am further told that Zeti was made aware of the instructions and had a hidden hand in planning the sabotage.
81. In the interim, Mansour had planned to publically dissociate IPIC from Aabar-BVI by ‘pointing out’ to Najib that 1MDB officials had made a grave error in judgment. The date for the announcement was deemed appropriate by Mansour and Qubaisi to afford the latter time to divest his holdings and that of his associates in all his BVI concerns.
82. Qubaisi was then in the midst of negotiating the sale of some assets in the US that I am told was purchased using funds diverted from Aabar.
83. But something unexpected happened.
84. Qubaisi became upset that Mansour was taking so long to remit some payments due to him. The payments related to Mansour’s seven-odd percent in Barclays (refer preceding article) that Qubaisi once held a beneficial interest in. On the 19thof July 2013, Mansour shocked everyone when he disposed of those shares, the existence of which was not known even to his advisors.
85. Following the sale, a misunderstanding erupted between Mansour and Qubaisi. The latter demanded a slice of profits since it was he who once held those shares in trust for Mansour. After some back and forth, Mansour agreed to channel ten percent of the profits to Qubaisi. But the ten percent never came.
86. On the 30thof July 2014, Qubaisi drew the line. He told Mansour that he had no intention of returning IPIC’s interests – worth some USD20 billion in various asset categories – that Qubaisi and his associates were the beneficial owners of. A very shaken Mansour immediately got in touch with an associate of his and related what had just happened.
87. When the associate heard what he heard, all hell broke loose. He insisted that Qubaisi be relieved of his positions in IPIC. But Mansour was reluctant to do so as both he and Qubaisi had jointly participated in the issue of some instruments. On the 10thof August 2014, a decision was reached – Mansour would delay the planned 15th of August 2014 announcement while he sorted things out.
88. On the 13th December 2014, Khairuddin lodges police report against 1MDB at the Dang Wangi police station at Mahathir’s behest.
89. Sometime in December 2014 also, Mahathir chairs a roundtable in London that was attended by Daim and four tycoons. Daim set a ballpark figure of RM2 billion as the amount needed to trigger a world media campaign and to bribe 40 – 50 MPs.
90. By then, Clare Rewcastle Brown had already been approached by persons from Blair’s camp to participate in a conspiracy to sabotage 1MDB. Owing to developments in Abu Dhabi, Ms. Rewcastle was told to put the spotlight on Jho Low while they figured out what to do with Qubaisi. On the 28thof February 2015, Ms. Rewcastle published Heist of the Century and zeroed in on Jho’s alleged relationship with Najib and his family.
91. When a July 2015 coup attempt against Najib fell flat on its face, plans changed. Ms. Rewcastle was told to shift the spotlight on Qubaisi by accusing the former IPIC Managing Director of conspiring with 1MDB officials to rob wealth that belonged to the people of Malaysia. She did just that through a 26thof September 2015 article titled King Khadem and his sovereign wealth.
92. In December 2015, Khairuddin and Matthias were met by the FBI’s Andrew McCabe as they went to the US with data Justo had stolen (and thereafter fabricated) from PetroSaudi and documents that were leaked to Blair. Matthias filed complaints with the FBI and the DoJ using a Mahathir-approved script that eventually set the tone for the 20th of July 2016 DoJ report.
93. Clare was promised a multi-million dollar reward in the event 1MDB lost its case in the London Court of International Arbitration. The case revolved around the status of the BVI registered Aabar which 1MDB insists was a subsidiary of IPIC.
94. The arbitration was Blair’s idea and a way of killing multiple birds with one stone – to get paid a commission from Mansour commensurate to the portion of money Qubaisi owed him and to saddle the Malaysian fund with more debt with the intent of destroying Najib, 1MDB and ultimately, Malaysia’s ties with China.
95. As for Mansour, a victory would have paved the way for him to trigger action pursuant to Abu Dhabi laws on grounds (allowed in Abu Dhabi) that the former IPIC Managing Director had used the same modus operandi to siphon wealth from the Abu Dhabi fund.
(Note: title was edited at 6.22 am, 21/08/2018, for accuracy purposes)